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This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to 
religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives 
are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that 
beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production 
of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations). 
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“Heaven rewards desirable behavior and hell increases the 
expected cost of misbehavior, causing an increase in enforcement 
effectiveness” (Hull and Bold, 1994, p. 449). 
 
1 Motivation 
Very recently, three salient topics have increased interest in the role of incentives in 
economic decisions: the loss aversion theory (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1991); the 
effectiveness of punishment (vs. rewards) in experimental settings
2 (Andreoni et al. 2003, 
Nikoforakis, 2008); and how results may vary when incentives are substantially larger – 
high stakes incentives (Slonim and Roth, 1998).  
This paper provides an empirical example of high stakes incentives, using more than 18 
thousand personal observations. It demonstrates that the effectiveness of punishment, when 
rewards are also available, is small. Thus, our data do not provide evidence in favour of the 
loss aversion theory. 
Our statistical approach is simple. Using the ISSP 1998: Religion II dataset, which focuses 
on religious individual behaviour, we estimate church-attendance equations and prayer 
equations (see for instance Brañas-Garza and Neuman, 2004). Church attendance and 
prayer are both measures of religious practice that, obviously, might be affected by 
incentives. 
In addition to a number of socio-demographic independent variables (age, education, etc.) 
we also introduced two dummies: ( =1) if the   individual absolutely believes in 
heaven and ( =1)
i carrot ith
i stick
3 if he absolutely believes in hell
4. Alternatively, in order to explore 
                                                 
2 There is a vast literature regarding these issues —see the references in Andreoni et al. (2003). Moreover, in 
a recent paper, Nonneman (2007) showed that the effectiveness of the threat of punishment (not even actual 
punishment) was already acknowledged almost four centuries ago: the Socialist Theocracy of the Jesuits in 
Paraguay, “La Misión” (1609-1767), was successfully run with the help of indoctrination instead of 
punishment.  
3  The carrot/stick terminology arises from Andreoni et al. (2003). 
4 The studies of Barro & McCleary (2003) or Torgler (2006) are excellent examples of the importance of 
religious beliefs on economic behaviour. 
 
  2the effect of the lack of incentives, the estimation was repeated using dummies for those 
who do not believe at all in the existence of heaven ( =1) or in hell ( =1).    i no carrot   i no stick
It was found that the effect of the carrot (heaven) is more than twice as large as the effect of 
the stick (hell). Consistently, we also found that the (negative) effect of the lack of belief in 
the existence of heaven is double the effect of the lack of belief in the existence of hell.  
To conclude, in the presence of the largest possible stakes (infinitum rewards)
5, rewards 
(carrots) are more effective than punishment in encouraging religious practice. 
 
2 Data, variables and definitions 
We used a unique rich database that was collected in 1998 under the International Social 
Survey Program: Religion II, supported by UNESCO. The survey was conducted in 28 
countries
6. Two questions included in this dataset were used to define the two dependent 
variables: 
o  Church (religious services) attendancei: is based on the question “How often do you 
attend religious services at the church?” that has six options: never (1); once a year 
(2); one or two times a year (3); once a month (4); two or three times a month (5); at 
least once a week (6). The term 'church' is used as a generic term that relates to the 
relevant religious place of worship (e.g., also synagogue for Jews, mosque for 
Moslems etc.). The religious rules of congregation vary between religions (e.g., 
many orthodox Jews congregate once or even twice a day, while Christians 
congregate once a week). However, the six categories of the question related to 
church attendance have levels that minimize this problem. For instance, the upper 
category is 'at least once a week', and it covers the most observant respondents from 
all religions. 
                                                 
5 Recall Pascal’s argument (extracted from "Pensées"): 
If you erroneously believe in God, you lose nothing (assuming that death is the absolute end), 
whereas if you correctly believe in God, you gain everything (eternal bliss). But if you correctly 
disbelieve in God, you gain nothing (death ends all), whereas if you erroneously disbelieve in 
God, you lose everything (eternal damnation). 
6  Germany, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, The United States, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, The Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, The 
Philippines, Japan, Spain, Latvia, The Slovak Republic, France, Cyprus, Portugal, Chile, Denmark, 
Switzerland.  
  3o  Prayeri: is based on the question “How often do you pray?” that has eleven 
alternative categories: never (1); once a year (2); twice a year (3); few times a year 
(4); once a month (5); two or three times a month (6); almost every week (7); every 
week (8); several times a week (9); once a day (10); several times a day (11). Here 
too, prayer obligations vary between religions (e.g., Jews need to pray 3 times a 
day; Moslems 5 times a day), but the upper category of 'several times a day' 
encompasses the most observant respondents. Church attendance is a public 
activity, whereas prayer is a private/intimate religious activity that has pure 
religious motives.  
Ordered Logit models were estimated. In these estimations, the equations have a non-linear 
form; both the sign and the size of the coefficients are easily comparable but can not be 
readily interpreted (see Branas-Garza and Neuman, 2004, for more on Ordered Logit 
estimation of religious practice equations). For each case (church-attendance and praying 
equations) we used the following list of independent variables: 
1)  Dummy variables related to beliefs  in heaven and in hell. These are our core   
variables and they arise from the following original dataset variables:  
o  Heaveni: is based on the question: “Do you believe in heaven?” that has four 
options: yes, definitely (1); yes, probably (2); no, probably not (3); no, definitely not 
(4). 
o  Helli: is based on the question: “Do you believe in hell?” that has the same four 
options: yes, definitely (1); yes, probably (2); no, probably not (3); no, definitely not 
(4). 
Using the latter two questions, the following dummy variables were defined: 
o  Carroti that takes the value of 1 if Heaveni = 1 (that is, the respondent definitely 
believes in heaven) and 0 otherwise. 
o  Sticki = 1 if Helli = 1 (the respondent definitely believes in hell) and 0 otherwise. 
Two additional dummy variables were defined in order to repeat the analysis in the 
opposite direction: 
o  No carroti = 1 if Heaveni = 4 (the respondent definitely does not believe in heaven) 
and 0 otherwise. 
  4o  No sticki = 1 if Helli = 4 and 0 otherwise (the respondent definitely does not believe 
in hell). 
In sum, we focused on those subjects who completely believe in heaven and/or hell and on 
those who do not believe at all. Note that both heaven and hell are personal and non-
transferable 'commodities'. For the former, the size of the premium and the penalty should 
be  “infinitum”; whereas for the latter, there is no incentive attached to their decision 
regarding how much to practice religious behaviour.  
2)  The list of socio-demographic variables included: age (over 60i =1); education 
(academic education [full or partial]i =1); marital status (marriedi =1; spouse has no 
religioni =1); and  family size (number of people in householdi ). 
3)  We also controlled for country specific variables: the Pluralism Index
7; and the 
country average of church-attendance (in church-attendance equations) and of prayer 
(in prayer equations). 
Table 1 presents the cross-distribution of the four stick/carrot options
8. Three parallel cross-
distributions are shown: for the whole sample (all the countries included in the survey); for 
European countries; and for predominantly Catholic countries (Spain, Italy, Ireland, 
Portugal and Poland). The estimation of church attendance and prayer equations will also 
be repeated for these three sets of countries. The European countries are mostly Christian 
and the Catholic countries are composed of an even more homogenous population that is 
predominantly Catholic. A comparison of the results for the three sets of countries will help 
to answer the question of whether the effects of the carrot/stick on religious practice are 
religion-specific or whether they are more universal and not dependent on the religious 
make-up of the country under discussion
9. 
                                                 
7 The P index represents religious pluralism and is defined as P=1-HHI, where HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index of concentration, defined as the sum of squares of the shares of the country’s religious denominations. 
The HHI is borrowed from industrial organization where it serves as a measure of the competitiveness of an 
industry. In an industry with a single monopolistic producer, HHI will equal 1. If the industry is composed of n 
firms of equal size, then HHI = 1/n and as the number of firms is increasing, HHI is approaching 0. It follows 
that P ranges between 0 (single denomination) and 1 (infinite number of denominations). The larger is P, the 
more religiously diverse is the country (see also Lieberson, 1969 and Voas et al., 2002 who referred to the 
same diversity/pluralism index). 
8 Given that subjects may believe (or not) in heaven and/or in hell, this creates a 2x2 factorial design.  
9 The religious homogeneity of the populations (in European countries and mainly in Catholic countries) also 
helps to overcome the problem of different perceptions of 'heaven' and 'hell' within different religions, e.g., in 
Japan, the majority of the population are both Shinto and Mahayana Buddhists – for them the concepts 
  5 
 
Table 1: Cross-Distributions of the Number (Percentage) of Believers/Non-believers in 
the Stick and Carrot  
Whole sample  Carrot=1 Carrot=0  Total 
Stick=1  4,063 (21.6%)  113 (0.6%)  4,176 (22.2%) 
Stick=0  1,469 (7.8%)  13,194 (70.0%)  14,663 (77.8%) 
Total  5,532 (29.4%)  13,307 (70.6%)  18,839 (100%) 
European countries  Carrot=1 Carrot=0  Total 
Stick=1  2,952 (18.5%)  89 (0.6%)  3,041 (19.0%) 
Stick=0  1,169 (7.3%)  11,754 (73.6%)  12,923 (81.0%) 
Total  4,121 (25.8%)  11,843 (74.2%)  15,964 (100%) 
Catholic countries  Carrot=1 Carrot=0  Total 
Stick=1  999 (26.9%)  21 (0.6%)  1,020 (27.5%) 
Stick=0  410 (11.0%)  2,283 (61.5%)  2,693 (72.5%) 
Total  1,409 (37.9%)  2,304 (62.1%)  3,713 (100%) 
 
The whole sample included 18,839 individuals, out of which 29.4% absolutely believe in 
heaven and 22.2% absolutely believe in hell. These percentages are smaller for European 
countries and higher for European Catholic ones. The cross-distribution demonstrates that 
not everybody who believes (disbelieves) in after-life rewards automatically believes 
(disbelieves) in after-life punishment. Around 20% believe in both (27% in the Catholic 
countries), whereas about 70% (61% in the Catholic countries) believe neither in the carrot 
nor in the stick. Belief in heaven is more common than belief in hell, leading to a sub-set of 
about 8% of individuals (7% in the European countries and 11% in the Catholic countries) 
who believe in heaven but not in hell. We do not have many observations for the “only 
punishment” case, i.e., for those who believe in hell but not in heaven (113, 89 and 21 
individuals respectively)
10. 
                                                                                                                                                     
'heaven' and 'hell' in the infinitum sense are irrelevant. You may reside for a time in a hell or heaven world – 
but you then reincarnate again. 
10 In this regard our treatments are very similar to those provided by Andreoni et al. (2003) but we do not 
have their “pure stick treatment”. 
  6The next section explores the effect of incentives on church-attendance and on praying, as 
reflected by the religious practice equations. 
 
3 Religious-practice estimation results 
Ordered Logit regression was used to estimate religious practice equations. The dependent 
variables are church attendance (six ordered values) and prayer (eleven ordered values). 
Regressions were run separately for females and males as is common in the literature (see 
Brañas-Garza & Neuman, 2004). For each case, the list of independent variables included 
our two core variables that relate to incentives (positive or negative) and the set of socio-
demographic variables. 
Table 2 presents the coefficients of the two core variables for each Ordered Logit equation, 
namely, church attendance and prayer. The top part of the table shows the equations (type 
A) which use the dummies for absolute beliefs in heaven/hell. The bottom part (type B) 
explores the opposed case, using dummies that reflect the complete lack of beliefs in 
heaven/hell. The full regressions that also include the coefficients of the control variables 
are presented in Appendix Tables A1, A2 and A3 and briefly described below. 
 
Table 2: Ordered Logit Religious Practice Regressions, Carrot/Stick Variables, 1998 
  Whole Sample  European Countries  Catholic Countries 
  ATTENDANCE PRAYER ATTENDANCE PRAYER ATTENDANCE PRAYER 
Equations A  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
















































              
Equations B  Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
















































Sample  size  9006 9823 9006 9823 7538 8420 7538 8420 1702 2009 1702 2009 
 
Significance (p values) in parentheses 
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The results are impressive. Examining the results for the whole sample we see that:  
First, incentives have a major effect on religious practice. Both the positive (heaven/carrot) 
and the negative (hell/stick) incentives have significant positive effects on the two variants 
of religious practice. Belief in heaven and in hell increases participation in mass services 
and increases prayer habits, while disbelief has the opposite effect.  
Second, the effect of the carrot (heaven) is much more pronounced than the effect of the 
stick (hell). For both the church attendance and the prayer equations and within both the 
male and the female samples, the coefficient of belief in heaven is more than twice as large 
as the coefficient of belief in hell. This is true for the dummy variables that reflect absolute 
beliefs and also for those that relate to the absolute lack of beliefs
11. These empirical 
findings clearly indicate that anticipated rewards have a much more pronounced effect on 
religious practice than expected penalties. 
Results are very similar when the sample is restricted to the European countries. 
Interestingly, within the sample of Catholic countries, both the carrot and the stick have 
smaller effects on religious practice and differences between rewards and punishments are 
even more pronounced
12. Moreover, the effect of 'hell' (stick) is not significant in most 
cases
13.  
                                                 
11 Beliefs (disbeliefs) in heaven and in hell are highly correlated, leading to multicollinearity. 
Multicollinearity could result in insignificance of one or two of the correlated variables. However, all 
coefficients are significant in the equations for the whole sample and the European sample. Moreover, 
regressions that included only one of the variables (either the 'heaven' or the 'hell' variable) also indicate that 
in most cases the effect of  'heaven' is larger (not presented, can be provided upon request) 
12 We do not have a convincing explanation for this empirical finding. Possible speculations are the following: 
(i) in Catholic countries both the belief in heaven/hell and religious practice (in terms of church attendance 
and prayer) are common and part of the local religious culture. The two are therefore less correlated in terms 
of cause and outcome; (ii) in the Catholic denomination there is less emphasize on the direct link between 
religious practice and the opportunity to reach heaven or hell: what you have to do to reach heaven is undergo 
baptism and either not commit any mortal sins or commit such a sin (as everybody eventually does) but 
receive the Sacrament of Penance before you die. The scale metaphor, of good deeds vs. bad ones where the 
heavier side determines your fate, as used in Judaism and also in other Christian denominations, is less 
relevant for Catholics. Therefore, the everyday religious practices, which accumulate as good or bad deeds, 
are also less important and there is less of an incentive to practice them – it is easy to avoid the stick. 
13 The insignificance could result from multicollinearity that is more pronounced in the Catholic sample. 
Regressions that included only the 'hell' variable resulted in a significant coefficient, e.g. in the church 
attendance equations: the coefficient of 'hell' in the male regression that included 'hell' only was 1.173 
(p=0.000), compared to a coefficient of 1.271 (p=0.000) in the equation that included 'heaven' only. The 
respective coefficients for 'hell' and 'heaven' in the female regressions were: 1.079 (p=0.000) and 1.168 
(p=0.000). 
  8Appendix Tables A1 (full sample), A2 (European sample) and A3 (Catholic sample) 
present the full type A regressions, including the coefficients of the independent variables 
that are used as controls. Table A3 does not include the P Index, because it is irrelevant 
when only Catholic countries are considered. Results of the control independent variables 
are very similar in equations of type B. As is evident from Appendix Tables A1, A2 and 
A3, a spouse with no religion has a pronounced negative effect on the intensity of religious 
practice, while all other explanatory variables (pluralism index; national average of 
practice; number of people in household; academic education; and age above 60 years) 
have positive effects on religious behaviour. The two major positive factors are those of age 
(that also reflects cohort effects) and of the religious make-up of the country. However, the 
effects of the carrot are more pronounced than those of the personal characteristics.  
 To conclude, we illustrated that incentives have a major effect on religious behaviour and 
that positive incentives have a much stronger effect than negative ones, when both are 
available. This result is basically similar to that proposed in the cooperation experiments 
described in Andreoni et al. (2003), where carrots (only) were much more effective than 
sticks (only). However we do not find their multiplicative “carrot-stick” effect since we 
observe that the added value of punishment is really poor. 
14
The following figures show the cumulative distributions of attendance and prayer for the 3 
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Yes Heaven, Yes Hell No Heaven, No Hell Yes Heaven, No Hell
 
                                                 
14  Also note that Andreoni et al. (2003) found that the effect of 'sticks' does not dependent on the 
presence/absence of 'carrots', while 'carrots' are more effective in the absence of 'sticks'. 
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For both church attendance and prayer it was found that the "No Heaven, No Hell" (no 
carrot – no stick) stochastically dominates the "Yes Heaven, Yes Hell" (carrot – stick) 
cumulative distribution; moreover, the “No Heaven, No Hell” stochastically dominates the 
”Yes Heaven, No Hell” (carrot but no-stick) distribution, and the latter, dominates the “Yes 
Heaven, Yes Hell” (carrot-stick) distribution
 15. 
                                                 
15 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov  test indicates whether the distribution of a variable is the same in two 
independent samples. We used this test, rather than a parametric one, because it deals with the comparison of 
distribution functions. Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we find that: (i) carrot-stick effects [Yes/Yes] are 
different from carrot (no stick) [Yes/No] incentives (except in catholic countries for the church-attendance 
distribution) (ii) carrot-no stick effects [Yes/No] are different from no carrot (no stick) [No/No] case for 
church-attendance and praying respectively. In next table are presented statistics and significance of the tests.  
   Whole Sample  European Countries  Catholic Countries 








(0.299)  Church 








  10Therefore from these figures we may conclude: 
1)  Positive and negative Incentives have a crucial effect on decisions. 
2)  The carrot effect is very large while the stick effect is much more reduced
16. 
In sum, we see that incentives have crucial effects on decisions regarding religious practice. 
Our study does support the pronounced effectiveness of positive rewards whereas no large 
effects are found for punishment. 
 
4 Concluding remarks 
This study employs data of more than 18 thousand personal observations to look into high 
stakes incentives (maximum/infinitum rewards and penalties). The regression analysis and 
also experimental economics methodologies (stochastic dominance and non-parametric 
tests) lead to equal conclusions: when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives 
are available, the former are more effective than the latter. 
Two salient implications arise from this study: 
o  Experimental results regarding the effectiveness of punishment (vs. rewards) are not 
supported by our large data set where high stakes are at work. 
o  The loss aversion theory is not confirmed, within a large sample, under high stakes 
scenarios. 
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  12APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A1. Ordered Logit Regressions, Whole Sample, 1998 
 ATTENDANCE  PRAYER 
 Male  Female  Male  Female 















































































Sample size  9006  9823  9006  9823 
Significance (p values) in parentheses 
 
  13Table A2. Ordered Logit Regressions, European Countries, 1998 
 ATTENDANCE  PRAYER 
 Male  Female  Male  Female 














































































Sample size  7538  8420  7538  8420 
Significance (p values) in parentheses 
 
 
  14Table A3. Ordered Logit Regressions, Catholic Countries, 1998 
 ATTENDANCE  PRAYER 
 Male  Female  Male  Female 






































































Sample size  1702  2009  1702  2009 
Significance (p values) in parentheses 
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